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Abstract 
The determinants of worker job satisfaction are estimated using a representative survey of three 
major cities in China.  Legally segregated migrants, floaters, earn significantly less than 
otherwise equivalent non-migrants but routinely report greater job satisfaction, a finding not 
previously reported.  We confirm a positive role for membership in the communist party but find 
that it exists only for non-migrants suggesting a club good aspect to membership.  In contrast to 
earlier studies, many controls mirror those found in western democracies including the "paradox 
of the contented female worker." 
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1. Introduction 
China recorded a twelve fold increase in real GDP from the start of its economic reform in 1978 
to 2005. This remarkable growth has been attributed, in part, to labor market institutions that 
help maintain extremely low labor costs. The absence of independent unions, a history of little or 
no employment protection and weak labor standards all provide something resembling at-will 
employment.  In addition, China has a legally segregated labor market with its rural migrant 
workers (floaters) accounting for as much as a third of the urban labor force but explicitly treated 
as secondary workers in the city. Many reports show that these secondary Chinese workers have 
harsh conditions with low or no job security, long hours without overtime pay and with the loss 
of social benefits that were tied to their original location.  Indeed, the United Nations (2005, p. 3) 
has noted "with deep concern the de facto discrimination against internal migrants in the fields of 
employment, social security, health service, housing and education that indirectly results from 
the restrictive household registration system (hukou) which continues to be in place despite 
official announcements regarding reforms." 
 This study provides a unique look at the role that Chinese labor market institutions play 
in determining the job satisfaction of workers.  Previous examinations of job satisfaction have 
disproportionately examined North American or European workers despite the rise of China as 
the world’s fourth largest economy.  Those studies that do examine workers in China are 
typically limited to a single occupation or workplace and have not focused on the role played by 
institutions (see Nielsen and Smyth 2008 for more on this point). We estimate the determinants 
of job satisfaction for Chinese workers across three major cities using the typical controls that 
have emerged in the economics literature but also focusing on the role played by migrant worker 
status and on the roles of unionization, state ownership and party membership.   
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 Despite suggestions in earlier work that “China is different,” we find that the controls 
broadly behave as in other economies.  Of particular interest may be our confirmation of the 
“paradox of the contented female worker.”  As in other economies, women appear to have 
greater job satisfaction all else held constant. At the same time, the determinants of job 
satisfaction emerge as broadly similar for both genders. Our examination of the institutions 
provides a rich portrait.  First, in contrast with Nielsen and Smyth (2008), we find that the 
migrants are generally more satisfied with their job despite earning substantially less.  We take 
this result to reflect their comparison of their city jobs to those left behind in the countryside. It 
appears to be this comparison that matters, rather than one to the permanent city residents. Yet, 
this may change over time and we examine the role that duration since migration might play. 
Second, we show how party membership and working for a state owned enterprise may be linked 
with greater job satisfaction. Critically, while this link holds for legal urban residents, it does not 
hold for migrants.  Party membership, in particular, holds no value for migrants.  This finding 
leads us to suggest that membership is a type of club good that does not transfer as workers 
migrate to the city.  We also show that unionization is uniformly irrelevant in determining job 
satisfaction, suggesting that it provides few benefits or genuine opportunities for workplace 
voice. 
 In the next section we defend our decision to investigate the job satisfaction of workers 
in China and explain some of the unique labor market institutions that make it an interesting 
investigation.  The third section presents the data we use and provides descriptive statistics. The 
fourth section presents the results across a variety of specifications and subsamples. The final 
section draws conclusions and suggests further research. 
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2.  Job Satisfaction in China: Setting the Stage 
Hamermesh (2001, p.2) makes clear why economists should study the determinants of job 
satisfaction: ‘Only one measure, the satisfaction that workers derive from their jobs, might be 
viewed as reflecting how they react to the entire panoply of job characteristics. Indeed, a 
potentially useful view is that job satisfaction is the resultant of the worker’s weighting in his/her 
own mind of all the job’s aspects. It can be viewed as a single metric that allows the worker to 
compare the current job to other labor-market opportunities.’ Hence, job satisfaction is a more 
global measure allowing economists to get closer to the fundamental concept of the aggregate 
well-being generated from a job, a concept poorly proxied by earnings alone. While such self-
reported measures of satisfaction have been criticized as subjective, Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1999) explain that such measures have been successfully used for years by social psychologists 
and do correlate in expected fashions with many objective outcomes. For example, workers with 
lower self-reported job satisfaction have higher absenteeism and are more likely to quit (Clark et 
al., 1998). Further, higher job satisfaction within a firm correlates positively with its performance 
(see Ostroff, 1992; for a recent study see Freeman et al, 2008) and, within service industries, job 
satisfaction correlates positively with customer satisfaction (Rogers et al., 1994).  Indeed, recent 
evidence by Krueger and Schkade (2008) confirms the reliability of such measures and argues 
for their continued use by economists. 
 The interest by economists in job satisfaction has yielded a series of reasonably 
consistent and robust findings. Job satisfaction is higher for the youngest and oldest workers 
(Clark et al., 1998), for women (Bender et al. 2005, Sloane and Williams 2000 and Clark 1997) 
for non-union workers (Clark, 1997; Bender and Sloane, 1998; Heywood et al., 2002) and for the 
less educated (Clark and Oswald, 1996). Moreover, job satisfaction measures tend to be reliable 
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showing little variation within and between surveys for the same worker (Kristensen and 
Westergaard-Nielsen 2007). Yet, all these findings come from European and North American 
samples that need not carry over to China. Certainly, both Loscooco and Bose (1998) and 
Nielsen and Smyth (2008) argue that China may be different with, for example, men likely to 
report greater job satisfaction. This difference could arise because Chinese women have a long 
history of more nearly equal labor force participation and expectations about work while still 
suffering discrimination. The “paradox of the contented female worker” found in western 
democracies should not apply in this view.  Thus, one objective of this study is to explore the 
extent to which the correlates confirmed in other countries apply in China. 
 More fundamentally, our interest revolves around the unique institutional aspects of the 
Chinese labor market. Key among these aspects is the internal system of residential registration.  
This system dates from 1950 and provides the urban labor market a barrier from rural migration 
that is unique among developing nations (Buckley 2001 pp. 21).  Since the mid-1980s the 
economic reforms have attracted huge numbers of rural workers to urban areas looking for work 
and while there has been some easing of the barrier, “it remains extremely difficult (except 
through costly and mostly illegal means) to transfer household registration from a rural to a 
urban location (Buckley 2001 pp. 22).”  In particular, a series of social benefits are tied to work 
units and their locations and migrants are unlikely to be eligible.  These include housing, 
pensions, health care and education.  As a consequence, migrants are often men who leave their 
family in the countryside and work in urban areas without a formal contract and without these 
social benefits (Zhao 1999).  These migrants move between temporary spells of employment 
giving rise to their nickname “floaters.”   
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 Past research has confirmed significant labor market differences between urban residents 
and rural migrants that cannot be explained by observed productivity differences.  Thus, the 
migrants earn significantly lower wages and have significantly lower occupational attainment 
even holding constant typical labor market observables such as education, training and 
experience (Meng and Zhang 2001).  Rural migrants remain concentrated in the worst jobs that 
are “dirty, dangerous and demeaning” (Nielsen and Smyth 2008; Maurer-Fazio and Dinh 2004). 
They often leave families behind, seldom assimilate with the urban population and portrayed 
negatively by the urban media (Daven 2000). Thus, it is not surprising that as secondary workers 
earning lower wages and without job security, benefits or formal protection, the rural migrants 
have been hypothesized to have lower job satisfaction than urban residents (Nielsen and Smyth 
2008).   
An alternative view recognizes that these workers have selected to become floaters and 
could have remained in the countryside.  Many of the critical determinants of job satisfaction 
turn on the role of expectations.  Thus, women are thought to be more easily satisfied as they 
expect less from employment than do men (Clark 1997) and better educated workers are thought 
to be less easily satisfied as they have high expectations. Similarly, the crushing poverty of the 
countryside may inform the job satisfaction of rural migrants causing them to have greater job 
satisfaction than urban residents who only compare themselves to other urban residents.  Yet, 
Zhao (1999) argues that actual comparison may be more complex than rural farm poverty and 
urban floater. He shows that the most desired move out of rural farm work is into rural nonfarm 
work and that migrants often leave out of frustration and inability to find rural nonfarm work. In 
fact, Nielsen and Smyth’s (2008) survey finds the job satisfaction of migrants to be 
insignificantly different from that of urban residents.  Unexplored remains the role of the 
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duration since migration.  Workers’ expectations presumably change with the time they have 
been working in the urban labor market. as they compare themselves less with those in the 
countryside and more with other urban workers.  We will directly test for the role that being a 
rural migrant plays on job satisfaction and will also examine the role of the duration since 
migration. 
While not recognized in the Chinese constitution, the Communist Party serves as the 
supreme political authority through its monopoly control of all state functions including the army 
and legislature.  The number of citizens belonging to the party has been increasing and is now 
over 70 million. Membership in the party is often seen as an “investment in political capital” that 
can lead to favorable jobs, allocations and licensing (Appleton et al. 2009).   Potential members 
undergo rigorous screening and, as a consequence, membership has alternatively been seen as an 
indicator of unmeasured productivity (Li et al. 2007).  While each path of causation generates an 
apparent wage premium for membership, we examine whether, conditional on earnings, 
membership is associated with greater job satisfaction.  If earnings are the only consequence of 
membership, one would anticipate no additional impact on job satisfaction yet there may be 
benefits in terms of status, access to decision makers and the ability to obtain non-wage benefits 
that suggest a positive influence.  Interestingly, many of these potential benefits may be thought 
of as club goods available to members but dependent upon participation in the local club that 
allocates them (Buchanan 1965).  This suggests that even if we confirm a role for membership it 
may not extend to migrants who leave their club as part of the migration. 
China has witnessed a gradual but steady increase in the share of production originating 
from privately owned enterprises (Bai et al.2007).  Yet, state owned enterprises remain of critical 
importance in many sectors and the consequence of ownership on job satisfaction remains a very 
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open question.  Previous large scale examinations of Chinese job satisfaction do not have 
indicators of ownership (Nielsen and Smyth 2008).  Smaller examinations comparing a few 
workplaces yield conflicting evidence with some following a typical finding from developing 
countries that job satisfaction is lower in state owned enterprises (Wang 2008 and Asiedu and 
Folmer 2007).1 This may reflect positive selection by workers into private firms, as the more 
able have a better chance of being rewarded, and the ability of these firms to be more selective in 
hiring.  Privately-owned enterprises in China receive many fewer government allocated 
employees and have more autonomy in recruitment and hiring (Zhu 2005). Yet, state owned 
enterprises follow more traditional practices with a greater emphasis on equality that could be 
perceived positively by some workers (Zhu 2005).  Thus, the a priori role of ownership remains 
unclear and our testing will provide evidence. 
Our primary objectives are to see the extent to which traditional models of jobs 
satisfaction are replicated using a broad Chinese sample and to focus on the unique aspects of the 
labor market during transition. These include the role of migrant status, and of duration since 
migration, the role of the communist party as a determinant and the influence of working for a 
state-owned firm.   
 
3. Data 
The study utilizes data from the 1998 Survey of Occupational Mobility and Migration (SOMM) 
collected by the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies in Oslo and the National 
Research Center for Science and Technology for Development in Beijing. The former is an 
independent non-profit research institute, and the latter is part of the Ministry of Science and 
Technology of China. Workers were surveyed in three major Chinese cities: Beijing, Wuxi, and 
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Zhuhai. These three cities were selected on purpose to “explore the effects of the transition in 
cities of different scale, region, and with different economic profiles” (Drury and Arneberg, 2001, 
p. 4). Beijing, as the capital of China, is dominated by the public service sector and large state 
enterprises. Its labor market is more diversified due to its size, but is less open compared with the 
market in the other two cities. Wuxi is a flourishing industrial city near Shanghai in the Yangtze 
River Delta area of Jiangsu province, and has followed a model of development that is based on 
collective and township-village enterprises. It is also a city chosen by the central government to 
test its new state enterprise reform policies. Zhuhai, as one of the earliest special economic zones 
in China, is dominated by joint-venture and foreign investment firms, and has the most 
developed labor market of the three. All three cities have absorbed a large inflow of rural 
immigrant workers due to their fast economic development, and together provide a good 
representation of well-developed cities in China. 
The survey randomly samples workers, with selection being carried out separately for 
local and migrant workers. A two-stage cluster sampling approach was used to obtain the local 
resident sample. In the first stage, a random stratification sample of Residential Committees  was 
selected based on location and size.2 In the second stage, a random sample of households within 
each Residential Committee was chosen to take part in a household survey. A separate group of 
clusters based on the neighborhood-level police stations was selected to obtain the migrant 
sample, and a random sample of migrant households was then selected to take part in the survey.  
The survey questionnaire had two parts. The first part was conducted at the household 
level and aimed to collect information about all of the household members, and the second part 
was for a randomly selected household member aged 16 or above. As migrants are minorities in 
the city, these individuals had to be over-sampled to achieve a suitably sized migrant sample. 
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The detailed working history information over the previous five years (1994-1998) was collected 
from the selected individuals. Together, the two parts of the survey obtained both detailed 
household information and detailed working history information of an adult member within each 
household. We use this data for our study because the survey was the first major integrated 
survey of residents and migrants in cities in China and stands as an under-utilized resource.  
The target sample size of the survey was 7,835 households, and the final completed sample 
contained 7,326 households. The sample sizes for Beijing, Wuxi, and Zhuhai were 2,446, 2,437, 
and 2,443, respectively. Due to missing information, our final sample contains 4,296 workers, of 
which 1,967 are migrant workers and 1,530 migrant workers from rural area.  The difference 
represents migrants between cities. 
 The SOMM provides a five-point scale of overall job satisfaction (from not satisfied at all 
to very satisfied). We follow the convention of examining the determinants of the probability of 
reporting each level of job satisfaction. The underlying latent variable is assumed to follow a 
cumulative normal, and the determinants are estimated by maximum likelihood using an ordered 
probit procedure (McKelvey and Zavonia, 1975). The estimated coefficients and cut-points can 
be used to predict the influence of critical variables on job satisfaction. The controls largely 
follow the economics literature on job satisfaction including demographics, employment 
relations, industrial and regional dummies, and human capital variables. These are outlined in 
Table 1 and include 13 variable definitions from which we create 12 dummy indicators. 
 The mean shows that average satisfaction level for floaters is only modestly lower, 2.45 
vs. 2.52 and the difference, .07, is not statistically significant.  Table 2 breaks the distribution 
down again revealing a higher concentration of the floaters among the lower categories.  The 
only statistically significant difference is the proportion in the slightly satisfied which is 
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disproportionately the urban residents rather than the floaters.  Thus, examining the raw data 
suggests only modestly lower job satisfaction among floaters. As a comparison, the average job 
satisfaction for women is a statistically significant .9 higher.  
 The means indicate that floaters earn less, are younger on average, have less education 
and are disproportionately male.  As anticipated, they are much less likely to be provided 
pensions or medical insurance and are heavily concentrated among manual (blue-collar) workers.   
 The methodology is to start with a parsimonious specification and add more controls 
searching for durable partial correlations. We will pay particular attention to the roles played by 
gender, migrant status and the other institutional indicators. Most estimates will include the 
comparison wage which is the worker's actual wage minus that predicted from a stand earnings 
equation. The inclusion of comparison wage follows from Clark and Oswald (1996) who view it, 
in part, as the difference between actual and expected earnings.  We emphasize that none of our 
critical results depend on use of comparison earnings.  While it emerges as a very important 
determinant of job satisfaction, the pattern of results remains unchanged if it is replaced by a 
simple measure of earnings itself.   The earnings equations generating the comparison wage are 
presented in Appendix Table 1and appear fairly standard with men earning more and education 
and experience taking conventional roles.  The floaters earn significantly less in the combined 
sample, a result being generated by a large decrement in earnings for male floaters.  Holding all 
else constant, male floaters earn nearly 10 percent less than comparable non-floaters.  
Unlike results from western democracies, the education variables will not routinely 
emerge as significant determinants of job satisfaction.  On the other hand, age emerges as a 
positive determinant of job satisfaction.  Our attempts to add an age squared term or other non-
linearities were rejected by the data for adding nothing to the explanatory power thus while older 
  
11 
workers are more satisfied, we found no evidence that younger workers are also more satisfied.  
We cannot confirm the typical U-shaped relationship in age but do confirm a direct effect.  As a 
consequence, none of our estimates will include terms beyond age itself. 
 
4. Results 
The parsimonious estimation of job satisfaction is shown in column 1 of Table 3.  Here the 
controls include the comparison wage, gender, age, education, marital status, party membership, 
city dummies and migrant status.  The comparison wage emerges with the anticipated large and 
significantly positive coefficient.  Women also emerge as significantly more satisfied, a finding 
in common with those based on Europeans and North American studies but not routinely found 
in previous studies of China.  The coefficient implies a marginal effect indicating that women are 
2.2 percentage points more likely to be in highest level of job satisfaction.  The results also 
confirm that married workers express greater job satisfaction.  Neither of the city dummies are 
statistically significant determinants. 
 Party membership emerges as a strong positive determinant.  The evidence suggests that 
members are 3.5 percentage points more likely to be in the highest satisfaction category.  This 
large effect emerges as statistically significant despite the inclusion of the earnings variable that 
might be thought to capture part of the return to membership. Thus, the benefits of members 
apparently go beyond simple remuneration and may include prestige, access and a variety of 
fringe benefits.3. The city-to-city migrants are not significantly different in job satisfaction in this 
parsimonious specification but the rural-to-city migrants emerge as significantly more satisfied.  
Thus, despite the lack of social benefits, employment protection or labor standards, the floaters 
emerge as 2.2 percent more likely to be in the highest job satisfaction category.  This result 
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suggests that the poor conditions of floaters relative to urban residents do not make their urban 
employment undesirable.  It may still be superior to their alternative rural employment 
opportunities. Certainly, self-selection would suggestion that migrants would move only in the 
expectation that the move would improve their circumstances. 
 The second column of Table 3 presents the full specification that includes dummy 
variables for 13 industries, size of employer, hours of work and other labor market institutions.  
The results support those from western democracies confirming that hours of work is a negative 
partial correlate of job satisfaction.   The size of employer plays a weak role with the middle size 
employer being associated with greater job satisfaction than the small employers but with no 
differences associated with the largest size employer.  Many of the industry dummies emerge as 
significant but unions play no role, consistent with their lack of voice.  Finally, state owned 
enterprises appear to be associated with somewhat higher job satisfaction even holding all other 
determinants constant.   
 We next explore the role of gender in greater detail to explore whether China also 
displays the paradox of the contented female.  We follow Bender et al. (2005) and Clark (1997) 
examining if the regime of determining job satisfaction differs by gender.  We divide the sample 
and separately estimate the determinants for men and for women.  These separate estimates are 
shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.  There are some apparent differences in pattern of 
significance for individual coefficients.  Thus, although positive for both men and women, the 
coefficient on age is only significant for men.  Similarly, while the coefficient for hours is 
negative for both men and women, it passes significant tests only for women.  The basic 
similarity in size and sign of the coefficients suggests we should run a likelihood ratio test to 
examine of the overall pattern of differences by gender.  We do this by nesting the specification 
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in column 2 within a fully stacked gender interaction model.  Thus, the likelihood ratio test 
examines whether the set of gender interactions add sufficiently to explanatory power and 
represents a non-linear version of the well known Chow test. The log likelihood on stacked 
model was -5536 and two times the difference generated a test statistic of 36.2. The resulting chi-
square test with 29 degrees of freedom fails to reject the hypothesis of equal coefficients, no 
added explanatory power, at even the 10 percent level (p-value = .1678).  Thus, the data reveals a 
pattern that shares both similarities and differences with those from western democracies.  On 
the one hand, we do find evidence that women are more satisfied.  On the other hand, the 
determinants of their satisfaction are essentially the same as those for men.  The difference in 
levels of satisfaction appears to be a simple shift factor. 
 Yet, even if the entire specification fails to find significant gender differences in regimes, 
it remains possible that individual variables may have significantly different influences by 
gender.  As a robustness check, we estimated a modified version of the specification in column 2 
that removed the simple gender variable and left the base group as male city residents.  To this 
five dummies were added that identified female city residents, male and female city-to-city 
migrants and male and female rural-to-city migrants. The pattern of the other coefficients in 
column 2 remained largely unchanged and all five of the new dummies emerged as positive and 
statistically significant.  Thus, female city residents emerged as significantly more satisfied than 
their male counterparts.  The coefficient of female rural-to-city migrants emerged as significantly 
larger than that for male rural-to-city migrants (at five percent) and the coefficient on female 
city- to-city migrants merged as significantly larger than that on male city-to-city migrants (at ten 
percent).  Thus, females in all migration statuses appear more satisfied than their male 
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counterparts in the same migration status.  Moreover, both male and female migrants are more 
satisfied than are city residents of the same gender.4 
 A second likelihood ratio test is used to explore what happens if we divide the sample by 
migratory status.  Our approach was to put both classes of migrants together into a single 
category and again create a full stacked interaction.  The test rejects the equality of coefficients 
but primarily because of a significant difference on a single coefficient, that on party 
membership.  If one allows for this difference, the remaining interactions do not significantly add 
to explanatory power.  In the first column of Table 4, we present this result.  While the other 
controls remain essentially as in Table 2, column 2, the coefficient on party membership 
increases in both size and significance indicating that party membership among city residents is 
associated with a very large 4.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of being in the 
highest satisfaction category.  At the same time the coefficient on the interaction of membership 
with migrant status is also statistically significant, even larger in size but negative.  Indeed, the 
sum of the two coefficients yields a negative but insignificant net effect.  Thus, party 
membership is extremely valuable to city residents but completely irrelevant to migrants.  It may 
have been relevant in their original location but the benefits simply do not move to the new 
location.  This result supports the view that membership has critical elements of a club good and 
that value of the club is dependent upon remaining in a worker's original location.5  Interestingly, 
our tests separating the two migratory categories suggest that the value of membership transfers 
for neither the city-to-city nor rural-to-city migrants.    
 We now add further controls in an effort to test the continuing durability of the 
relationships we have identified.  Specifically, we have indicators of two fringe benefits that are 
likely to increase job satisfaction but are more likely among permanent city residents.  In column 
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2, we add indicators of employer provided pensions and health insurance. As anticipated, they 
are strong positive determinants of job satisfaction with pension provision increasing the 
likelihood of reporting the highest level of job satisfaction by 4.6 percentage points and 
insurance increasing that likelihood by 1.9 percentage points.  Also as anticipated, the inclusion 
of these two controls holds constant one of the factors that tends to make the conditions of 
migrants worse and so causes the estimated relative job satisfaction of the migrants to increase.  
Interestingly, the inclusion of these two indicators causes the state ownership coefficient to 
decline and lose statistical significance suggesting that one of the advantages of working in a 
state owned enterprise may be differential access to fringe benefits.  Despite this change, the 
basic result from column 2 is the stability in the general pattern of results we identified earlier.  
The roles of migratory status, party membership, unionization, gender and the other controls 
remain unchanged. 
 In column 3, we provide the most complete specification which adds occupational 
dummies to the specification presented in table 3.  Again, migrants are crowded into manual 
(blue-collar) and low level service occupations and we anticipate job satisfaction may differ by 
occupation.  All three of the occupational dummies take significant positive coefficients relative 
to the base occupation of manual workers. As anticipated, controlling for occupation (the 
segregation of migrants) causes their estimated relative job satisfaction to increase still further.  
Yet, the inclusion of occupation does little to change the other results and even brings the 
coefficient on state-ownership close to significance. The one marked change is the growth in the 
coefficient associated with the highest educational category.  Holding occupation constant those 
with a college degree or above are significantly less satisfied.  This result now fits the typical 
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result from the studies of western democracies and the notion that higher education may generate 
unfilled job expectations. 
 As an additional check, we reran all of our estimates using the actual wage as a 
determinant rather than the comparison wage.  There are very few substantive changes. As an 
illustration, we show the full sample test from column 2 of Table 3 using the actual wage.  This 
estimate is the final column of Table 4. The role of migrants, state-ownership and party 
membership continue to play the same role.  The differences that emerge in this estimate and the 
others using the actual wage are less indication that marriage is associated with greater job 
satisfaction and much stronger indications that education is negatively associated with job 
satisfaction. 
 Finally, we return to our estimation of job satisfaction for the sample of migrants 
separately.  We emphasized earlier that the major statistical difference in this subsample was the 
absence of role for party membership and this is evident in the first column of Table 5. 
Comparison income, marital status, age and gender continue to play the same role as in the 
sample at large and in the sample of permanent city residents.  We experimented with duration of 
time since migration as a further explanatory variable to those shown in column 1.  It emerged 
with a small negative coefficient that was statistically insignificant.  Our expectation was that 
duration might cause the comparisons and expectations of migrants to become focused on others 
living in the city and as a consequence might be associated with a diminution in job satisfaction.  
In other words, the migrants no longer compare their current situation to life in countryside but 
to those they view around them.  There is no evidence of this.  It remains possible that duration 
brings offsetting benefits such as larger networks and increased familiarity with the urban setting 
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and job market.  It may also be the case that the influence of duration differs by some of the 
observable characteristics, a possibility we explore next. 
 In particular, there may be gender differences in the role of duration. Female migrants 
appear less likely to be separated from spouses and family when working in the city than are 
male migrants. This may improve networking and improve job satisfaction over time.  It may 
also lead to selection effects in which only those women with higher job satisfaction remain in 
the city.  Moreover, Liang and Chen (2004) have argued that long term female migrants may 
suffer less gender discrimination in urban locations (such as Shenzhen the location of their study) 
than in the rural location from which they come. In particular, they show that female migrants 
are more likely to move into a professional job over time than are male migrants and that moving 
to an urban area increases the employment options of women more than men. As a consequence, 
we suspect gender differences may be evident in the role of duration on job satisfaction.   
We test this in the second column of Table 4 in which we include both the duration 
variable and the interaction of duration with gender.  The results are dramatic.  They suggest that 
for women longer duration is associated with significantly greater job satisfaction.  This result 
speaks to the benefits of integration and familiarity.  Yet, for men there is no influence of 
duration at all. On net, they neither benefit from integration nor change their expectations.  
Greater duration does not change their apparent countryside comparison.  Again, this might be 
anticipated if men are typically separated from spouses and families and recognize they may 
eventually return to the countryside.   
An important point about including the gender specific duration effects is that it 
eliminates the influence of gender itself since the coefficient on gender drops to around a third of 
its previous size and to insignificance.  This change suggests that the reason that female migrants 
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are more satisfied than male migrants is that duration brings benefits to women but not to men.  
Thus, at first arrival there is no difference in job satisfaction by gender but it emerges as duration 
increases.  The mean difference in satisfaction by gender from column 1 is reflected in the 
coefficient of approximately .143.  Examining the coefficients in column 2 shows that this mean 
difference will be achieved after a duration of around 3.6 periods [(.143 -.056)/.024 =3.63].  
Thus, the influence of duration shows strong gender patterns that help explain why female 
migrants are more satisfied then male migrants.6 
The overall pattern regarding migrants suggests that with only a parsimonious set of 
controls they report greater job satisfaction, especially so for the rural migrants.  None of our 
further investigations did anything to change this result.  Duration since migration might be 
anticipated to cause the migrants to judge themselves against urban peers and so be associated 
with lowered satisfaction.  We found no evidence for this.  Instead, we found that the job 
satisfaction of men is not associated with duration while that for women actually increases with 
duration.  Thus, while we share the concerns of the United Nations and others about the 
consequences of limiting mobility, we cannot help but note that the migrants routinely report 
greater satisfaction.  This was evident even before controlling for the lack of access to fringe 
benefits and the occupational segregation that represent part of differential treatment of migrants.  
Obviously, after controlling for these, the greater satisfaction is even more evident. 
  
5. Conclusions 
The broad pattern of determinants of job satisfaction among Chinese workers appears 
remarkably similar to those from western democracies.  Job satisfaction declines with hours 
worked and increases with earnings or with comparison earnings. It increases with age and, in 
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several specifications, decreases with education. It is higher for married workers and women.  
All of these results would be predicted from the bulk of studies from Europe and North America 
but not necessarily from previous studies from China. Indeed, working for a state-owned 
enterprise has, if anything, a positive influence on good satisfaction, a finding in keeping with 
western democracies and at variance with much of the evidence from transition economies. A 
variation from our estimation is that while women report higher job satisfaction, they do not 
seem to be subject to markedly different determinants of job satisfaction. 
The primary focus of our study has been the labor market institutions of China with 
particular interest on migrant workers.  We confirm that rural migrant workers earn significantly 
less than otherwise equivalent non-migrants. Yet, migrants routinely report greater job 
satisfaction, a finding not previously reported.  We confirm a positive role for membership in the 
communist party but find that it exists only for non-migrants.  Any value that membership might 
have in the countryside is lost when migrants move to urban areas suggesting a club good aspect 
to membership.  State-owned enterprises are associated with slightly higher job satisfaction but 
this seems to reflect the greater likelihood of fringe benefits.   
Duration of migration was anticipated to change the frame of reference toward the new 
urban setting.  Duration, we suspected, might cause  migrants to judge their job satisfaction more 
harshly.  We found no evidence to back this suspicion.  Instead, we found that duration was 
irrelevant for male migrants suggesting a continual segregation and maintenance of their original 
frame of reference.  We venture that this may reflect their temporary status with separation from 
spouse and family.  Duration for women migrants was associated with higher job satisfaction 
suggesting integration and accommodation to the new urban setting.   
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In sum, we uncovered little or no indication that rural migrants suffer lower job 
satisfaction.  Instead, like most  analysts we appear to be picking-up the influence of positive 
selection.  Migrants would not have moved had they not anticipated an improvement in 
circumstances, an improvement that is reflected in higher job satisfaction.  We stress that our 
study does not aim to evaluate Chinese residency restrictions that would seem to be an inefficient 
restriction on movement.  Nonetheless, the self-evaluation of the migrants of their employment 
suggests that the restrictions are not responsible for generating undesirable jobs.  We recognize 
that our conclusions are generated by a single cross-section in three large towns, and that 
longitudinal data would allow potential comparisons of job satisfaction before and after 
migration as well as following individual workers during the period after migration.  While we 
are not aware of such data, it is important to recognize it might present a different picture. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables 
 
 Means (Standard Deviations) 
Variables   Full-sample City residents Floaters 
Job satisfaction (0-4 Likert scale) 2.496 
(0.954) 
2.520 
(0.943) 
2.45 
(0.970) 
Log weekly wage 6.677 
(0.573) 
6.770 
(0.605) 
6.515 
(0.472) 
Usual weekly working hours 954.191 
(908.897) 
1059.942 
(1000.51) 
769.360 
(683.820) 
Dummy for rural floaters 0.364 
(0.481) 
  
Dummy for urban migrants 0.103 
(0.304) 
0.162 
(0.369) 
 
Age 32.223 
(10.107) 
34.404 
(9.862) 
26.667 
(7.890) 
Working experience  15.917 
(10.407) 
18.239 
(10.601) 
11.887 
(8.699) 
Education dummies:    
Primary and below (Educ1) 0.087 
(0.282) 
0.056 
(0.229) 
0.141 
(0.346) 
Lower secondary (Educ2) 0.402 
(0.490) 
0.271 
(0.444) 
0.632 
(0.482) 
High school (Educ3) 0.344 
(0.475) 
0.416 
(0.493) 
0.218 
(0.413) 
College and above (Educ4) 0.167 
(0.373) 
0.258 
(0.437) 
0.007 
(0.086) 
Male dummy 0.560 
(0.496) 
0.539 
(0.499) 
0.596 
(0.491) 
Dummy for married 0.635 
(0.482) 
0.745 
(0.436) 
0.441 
(0.497) 
Dummy for divorced or widowed 0.020 
(0.140) 
0.028 
(0.166) 
0.006 
(0.075) 
Dummy for party member 0.139 
(0.346) 
0.193 
(0.395) 
0.043 
(0.204) 
Dummy for public sector workers 0.440 
(0.496) 
0.552 
(0.497) 
0.245 
(0.430) 
Dummy for union members 0.422 
(0.494) 
0.609 
(0.488) 
0.095 
(0.293) 
Firm size dummies:    
1-99 workers (Size1) 0.292 
(0.455) 
0.307 
(0.461) 
0.266 
(0.442) 
100 to 499 workers (Size2)  0.253 
(0.435) 
0.251 
(0.434) 
0.255 
(0.436) 
500 and above (Size3) 0.455 
(0.498) 
0.441 
(0.497) 
0.480 
(0.500) 
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 Means (Standard Deviations) 
Variables   Full-sample City residents Floaters 
Fringe benefit dummies:    
Pension 0.302 
(0.460) 
0.459 
(0.498) 
0.029 
(0.168) 
Medical insurance 0.273 
(0.445) 
0.379 
(0.485) 
0.087 
(0.282) 
Region dummies:    
Beijing 0.287 
(0.452) 
0.338 
(0.473) 
0.198 
(0.399) 
Wuxi 0.322 
(0.467) 
0.335 
(0.472) 
0.300 
(0.459) 
Zhuhai 0.391 
(0.488) 
0.327 
(0.469) 
0.502 
(0.500) 
Occupation dummies:    
Leading cadre in government, 
professional/technical & related 
workers 
0.163 
(0.370) 
0.245 
(0.430) 
0.217 
(0.146) 
Other non-manual workers 0.159 
(0.366) 
0.193 
(0.395) 
0.100 
(0.301) 
Service workers 0.210 
(0.407) 
0.239 
(0.423) 
0.167 
(0.374) 
Manual workers 0.464 
(0.499) 
0.324 
(0.468) 
0.708 
(0.455) 
Industry dummies:    
Mining, quarrying, electricity, gas 
& water 
0.013 
(0.114) 
0.195 
(0.138) 
0.002 
(0.431) 
Manufacturing 0.469 
(0.499) 
0.387 
(0.487) 
0.614 
(0.487) 
Construction 0.100 
(0.300) 
0.051 
(0.220) 
0.186 
(0.389) 
Transport storage & 
communications 
0.031 
(0.173) 
0.416 
(0.200) 
0.012 
(0.108) 
Wholesale/ retail trade, restaurants 0.120 
(0.325) 
0.143 
(0.351) 
0.080 
(0.271) 
Banking & insurance 0.012 
(0.107) 
0.018 
(0.132) 
0.001 
(0.025) 
  Real estate 0.014 
(0.117) 
0.018 
(0.133) 
0.006 
(0.075) 
Social services 0.810 
(0.273) 
0.091 
(0.287) 
0.645 
(0.246) 
Health care sporting & social 
welfare 
0.021 
(0.145) 
0.027 
(0.163) 
0.112 
(0.105) 
Education culture arts & media 0.045 
(0.207) 
0.068 
(0.251) 
0.004 
(0.658) 
Scientific research/ polytechnic 
services 
0.015 
(0.121) 
0.217 
(0.146) 
0.003 
(0.556) 
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 Means (Standard Deviations) 
Variables   Full-sample City residents Floaters 
Government/ party agencies & 
social organizations 
0.059 
(0.235) 
0.090 
(0.286) 
0.005 
(0.070) 
Agricultural and others  0.017 
(0.128) 
0.021 
(0.144) 
0.009 
(0.928) 
Sample size 4430 2818 1612 
 
 
  
24 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Job Satisfaction 
Job satisfaction Full City residents  Floaters 
Not satisfied at all (0) 3.11% 2.93% 3.43% 
Slightly not satisfied (1) 9.81% 9.25% 10.79% 
Neither satisfied nor  
Dissatisfied (2) 
35.27% 34.63% 36.38% 
Slightly satisfied (3)** 37.98% 39.22% 35.81% 
Very satisfied (4) 13.84 13.98% 13.59% 
 
**The difference in proportions is statistically significant at the five percent level.
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Table 3. Initial Results (dep var: job satisfaction) 
 1 
 
2 3 
Male 
4 
Female 
Comparison 
Earnings 
.2438** 
[.0515] 
(13.56) 
.2476** 
(.0512) 
(13.74) 
.2267** 
[.0481] 
(9.48) 
.2881** 
[.0566] 
(10.24) 
Female 
 
.1027** 
[.0218] 
(3.00) 
.1069** 
[.0222] 
(3.01) 
  
Age 
 
.0111** 
[.0024] 
(4.53) 
.0097** 
[.0020] 
(3.81) 
.0114** 
[.0024] 
(3.56) 
.0066 
[.0012] 
(1.43) 
Education2 
 
.0691 
[.0147] 
(1.12) 
.0699 
[.0146] 
(1.11) 
.0589 
[0.126] 
(0.68) 
.0738 
[.0147] 
(0.78) 
Education3 
 
.0511 
[.0109] 
(0.78) 
.0241 
[.0050] 
(0.36) 
-.0185 
[-.0039] 
(0.20) 
.0705 
[0.140] 
(0.78) 
Education4 
 
.0882 
[.0192] 
(1.19) 
-.0448 
[-.0091] 
(0.570) 
-.0378 
[-.0079] 
(0.36) 
-.0834 
[-0159] 
(0.70) 
Married 
 
.1182** 
[.0245] 
(2.53) 
.1022** 
[.0208] 
(2.14) 
.1287** 
[.0265] 
(2.08) 
.0905 
[.0177] 
(1.14) 
Divorced or 
Widowed 
-.0783 
[-.0158] 
(0.64) 
-.0917 
[-.0180] 
(0.74) 
.0349 
[.0076} 
(0.18) 
-.1501 
[-.0207] 
(0.91) 
Party 
Membership 
.1549 
[.0348] 
(3.04)** 
.1164** 
[.0252] 
(2.22) 
.1183* 
[.0262] 
(1.77) 
.0566 
[.0114] 
(0.65) 
City Migrant 
 
.0904 
[.0175] 
(1.25) 
.1876** 
[.0420] 
(2.94) 
.2230** 
[.0493] 
(2.62) 
.1507 
[0.317] 
(1.54) 
Rural Migrant 
(Floater 
.1007** 
[.0216] 
(2.19) 
.2204** 
[.0471] 
(4.16) 
.2260** 
[.0494] 
(3.29) 
.2147** 
[.0441] 
(2.50) 
State Owned 
Enterprise 
 .0785* 
[.0163] 
(1.74) 
.1424** 
[.0304} 
(2.39) 
-.0241 
[-.0047] 
(0.34) 
Union 
Membership 
 .0530 
[.0110] 
(1.10) 
.0101 
[.0021] 
(0.15) 
.1308 
[.0260] 
(0.80) 
Hours of Work 
 
 -.0033** 
[-.0007] 
(2.48) 
-.0024 
[-.0005] 
(1.41) 
-.0049** 
[-.0009] 
(2.24) 
Size 1 
 
 .0750* 
[.0157} 
(1.72) 
-.0024 
[-.0004] 
(0.04) 
.1955** 
[.0407] 
(2.91) 
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Size 2 
 
 .0305 
[.0043] 
(0.50) 
.0032 
[.0007] 
(0.06) 
.0456 
[.0091] 
(0.75) 
City Dummies 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Industry 
Dummies 
 YES YES YES 
N 4339 4280 2381 1899 
Log likelihood -5696.2 -5554.3 -3073.6 -2462.4 
Chi-squared 282.4** 393.2** 233.1** 193.9** 
 
Square brackets contain the marginal effect on the probability of being in the highest satisfaction category. 
Asymptotic t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
*statistically significant at the 10 percent level 
**statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 4: Further Estimates on Job Satisfaction 
 1 
 
2 3 
 
4 
 
Comparison 
Earnings 
.2470** 
[.0510] 
(13.70) 
.2487** 
(.0511) 
(13.79) 
.2507** 
[.0481] 
(13.89) 
 
 
Actual  
Earnings 
 
   .5178 
[ 
(14.65) 
Female 
 
.1053** 
[.0219] 
(2.95) 
.1060** 
[.0219] 
(2.97) 
.0850** 
[.0174] 
(2.35) 
.1034** 
[ 
(2.91) 
Age 
 
.0094** 
[.0024] 
(3.71) 
.0097** 
[.0020] 
(3.81) 
.0061** 
[.0012] 
(2.37) 
.0085** 
[ 
(3.34) 
Education2 
 
.0657 
[.0136] 
(1.04) 
.0564 
[.0116] 
(0.89) 
.0423 
[.0086] 
(0.67) 
-.0172 
[ 
(0.27) 
Education3 
 
.0221 
[.0046] 
(0.33) 
.0115 
[.0024] 
(0.17) 
-.0472 
[-.0095] 
(0.69) 
-.1412** 
[ 
(2.07) 
Education4 
 
-.0533 
[-.0107] 
(.68) 
-.0694 
[-.0091] 
(0.89) 
-.2077** 
[-.0391] 
(2.51) 
-.3786 
[] 
(4.64) 
Married 
 
.1025** 
[.0208] 
(2.15) 
.1130** 
[.0228] 
(2.36) 
.1075** 
[.0216] 
(2.25) 
.0561 
[ 
(1.17) 
Divorced or 
Widowed 
-.0883 
[-.0173] 
(0.71) 
-.0689 
[-.0136] 
(0.55) 
-.0691 
[.0136} 
(0.56) 
-.1083 
[ 
(0.87) 
Party 
Membership 
.1854** 
[.0412] 
(3.11) 
.1689** 
[.0353] 
(2.69) 
.1399** 
[.0262] 
(2.33) 
.0990* 
[ 
(1.88) 
Party Member 
X Migrant 
 
-.2931** 
[-.0511] 
(2.45) 
-.2968** 
[-.0514] 
(2.48) 
-.3086** 
[-.0528] 
(2.58) 
 
City Migrant 
 
.2167** 
[.0491] 
(3.34) 
.2591** 
[.0595] 
(3.96) 
.2531** 
[.0578] 
(3.87) 
.1824** 
[ 
(2.86) 
Rural Migrant 
(Floater) 
.2382** 
[.0512] 
(4.45) 
.2967** 
[.0638] 
(5.44) 
.3111** 
[.0668] 
(5.69) 
.2604** 
[ 
(4.91) 
State Owned 
Enterprise 
.0788* 
[.0163] 
(1.75) 
.0605 
[.0125] 
(1.34) 
.0740 
[.0152} 
(1.63) 
.0749* 
[ 
(1.66) 
Union 
Membership 
.0541 
[.0112] 
(1.13) 
.0066 
[.0013] 
(0.14) 
.0120 
[.0024] 
(0.24) 
.0349 
[ 
(0.73) 
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Hours of Work 
 
-0032** 
[-.0007] 
(2.40) 
-.0030** 
[-.0006] 
(2.21) 
-.0028** 
[-.0006] 
(2.07) 
-.0034** 
[ 
(2.57) 
Size 1 
 
.0753* 
[.0158] 
(1.73) 
.0883* 
[.0185} 
(2.21) 
.0639 
[.0135] 
(1.45) 
.0559 
[ 
(1.28) 
Size 2 
 
.0240 
[.0049] 
(0.59) 
.0292 
[.0061] 
(0.71) 
.0117 
[.0024] 
(0.38) 
.0211 
[ 
(0.51) 
Pension  
 
.2157** 
[.0465] 
(4.66) 
.2099** 
[.0449] 
(5.07) 
 
Health 
Insurance 
 .0914** 
[.0192] 
(2.10) 
.0882** 
[.0184] 
(2.02) 
 
Regional 
Dummies 
 
YES YES YES YES 
Industry 
Dummies 
YES YES YES YES 
Occupational        
Dummies 
NO NO YES NO 
N 4280 4280 4280 4280 
Log likelihood 5551.3 5537.3 -5521.5 -5541.5 
Chi-squared 399.2** 427.8** 459.3** 419.3** 
 
Square brackets contain the marginal effect on the probability of being in the highest satisfaction category. 
Asymptotic t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
*statistically significant at the 10 percent level 
**statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table 5: Subsample of Migrants 
 1 
 
2 
Comparison Earnings .2583** 
[.0522] 
(9.21) 
.2601** 
(.0526) 
(9.13) 
Female 
 
.1429** 
[.0293] 
(2.58) 
.0564 
[.0114] 
(0.77) 
Duration 
 
 .0239** 
[.0048] 
(1.97) 
Duration X 
Male 
 
 -.0242* 
[-.0049] 
(1.74)* 
Age 
 
.0142** 
[.0029] 
(3.20) 
.0135** 
[.0028] 
(2.91) 
Education2 
 
.0482 
[.0147] 
(0.61) 
.0530 
[.0107] 
(0.66) 
Education3 
 
-.0229 
[-.0046] 
(0.26) 
-.0162 
[-.0033] 
(0.18) 
Education4 
 
-.1894 
[-.0345] 
(1.35) 
-.1789 
[-.0328] 
(1.20) 
Married 
 
.1433** 
[.0293] 
(2.18) 
.1288** 
[.0263] 
(1.94) 
Divorced or 
Widowed 
-.3004 
[-.0506] 
(0.99) 
-.3353 
[-.0553] 
(1.09) 
Party Membership -.1224 
[-.0231] 
(1.14) 
-.1225 
[-.0232] 
(1.13) 
City Migrant 
 
.0102 
[.0020] 
(0.09) 
.-0094 
[-.0019] 
(0.14) 
State Owned Enterprise .0320 
[.0065] 
(0.45) 
.0335 
[.0068] 
(0.47) 
Union Membership .1277 
[.0273] 
(1.53) 
.1229 
[.0263] 
(1.46) 
Hours of Work 
 
-.0018 
[-.0004] 
(1.07) 
-.0019 
[-.0004] 
(1.09) 
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Size 1 
 
.0614 
[.0126 
(0.94) 
.0564 
[.0120} 
(0.89) 
Size 2 
 
.0156 
[.0037] 
(0.27) 
.0136 
[.0028] 
(0.23) 
Regional Dummies 
 
YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES 
N 1990 1990 
Log likelihood -2621.2 -2607.5 
Chi-squared 180.8** 186.8** 
 
Square brackets contain the marginal effect on the probability of being in the highest satisfaction category. 
Asymptotic t-statistics are in parenthesis. 
*statistically significant at the 10 percent level 
**statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
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Appendix Table 1: Earnings Equations 
 
Variables 
 
1 
Full 
2 
Male 
3 
Female 
Log Usual weekly 
working hours 
0.398 
(1.37) 
0. 062 (1.66*) -.024 
(-0.52) 
Male dummy 0.197 
(12.73***) 
 0.016 
(3.35***) 
Working experience 0.156 
(5.06***) 
0.017 
(4.18***) 
-0.0003 
(-2.82***) 
(Working experience)2 -0.0003 
(-5.16***) 
-0.0004 
(-4.65***) 
0.139 
(3.42***) 
Education dummies:    
Lower secondary  0.153 
(5.34***) 
0.153 
(3.83***) 
0.265 
(5.67) 
High school 0.288 
(9.03***) 
0.286 
(6.49***) 
0.265 
(5.67***) 
College and above 0.554 
(14.06***) 
0 .534 
(9.87***) 
0.557 
(9.60***) 
Dummy for rural floaters -0.054 
(-2.28**) 
-0.099 
(-3.19***) 
-0.023 
(-0.61) 
Dummy for urban 
migrants 
0.028 
(1.00) 
0.020 
(0.53) 
0.031 
(0.73) 
Dummy for married 0.039 
(1.62) 
0.123 
(3.97***) 
-0.075 
(-1.98**) 
Dummy for divorced or 
widowed 
-0.353 
(-0.63) 
0.071 
(0.79) 
-0.143 
(-1.94*) 
Dummy for public sector 
workers 
0.0025 
(0.13) 
-0.0226 
-0.85 
0.048 
(1.61*) 
Dummy for union 
members 
0.012 
(0.54) 
0.003 
(0.11) 
0.012 
(0.39) 
Region dummies:    
Beijing -0.291 
(-13.52***) 
-0.248 
(-8.52***) 
-0.346 
(-10.78***) 
Wuxi -0.382 
(-20.16***) 
-0.357 
(-13.80***) 
-0.403 
(-14.54***) 
Dummy for party 
member 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
-0.015 
(-0.49) 
0.034 
(0.90) 
Firm size dummies:    
1-99 workers 0.015 
(0.76) 
0.042 
(1.64) 
-0.012 
(-0.40) 
100 to 499 workers -0.014 
(-0.80) 
0 .013 
(0.52) 
-0.044 
(-1.69*) 
Fringe benefit dummies:    
Pension 0.020 
(0.96) 
-0.016 
(-0.57) 
0.060 
(2.02**) 
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Variables 
 
1 
Full 
2 
Male 
3 
Female 
Medical insurance 0.001 
(0.06) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.43) 
Occupation dummies:    
professional/technical & 
related workers 
0.246 
(9.10***) 
0.229 
(5.94***) 
0.274 
(6.97***) 
Other non-manual 
workers 
0.143 
(6.05***) 
0.095 
(3.17***) 
0.227 
(5.76***) 
Service workers -0.017 
(-0.73) 
0.031 
(0.99) 
-0.053 
(-1.43) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
R2 0.310 0.3402 0.3681 
Sample size 4296 2397 1899 
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 ENDNOTES 
                                                
1Such findings can be contrasted with studies from western democracies that often show 
government employees with greater job satisfaction (Heywood et al. 2002). 
2Residential committees are neighborhood-level administrative units consisting of 400 to 1000 
households. 
3If party membership reflects greater ability, this finding may suggest the more able have greater 
job satisfaction. 
4 The full estimate with the five separate gender and migrant dummies is available from the 
authors upon request. 
5If party membership simply reflects ability, it would appear that the migrants had greater ability 
than their rural peers but not other urban residents. 
6 We recognize that our projections about the influence of duration are based on cross-sectional 
evidence and do not follow particular migrants over time.  If migrants differ in vintage, this 
heterogeneity may in appropriately be identified as an influence of duration. 
